We study the design of truthful mechanisms that do not use payments for the generalized assignment problem (GAP) and its variants. An instance of the GAP consists of a bipartite graph with jobs on one side and machines on the other. Machines have capacities and edges have values and sizes; the goal is to construct a welfare maximizing feasible assignment. In our model of private valuations, motivated by impossibility results, the value and sizes on all job-machine pairs are public information; however, whether an edge exists or not in the bipartite graph is a job's private information. That is, the selfish agents in our model are the jobs, and their private information is their edge set. We want to design mechanisms that are truthful without money (henceforth strategyproof ), and produce assignments whose welfare is a good approximation to the optimal omniscient welfare.
INTRODUCTION
The design of truthful mechanisms, where selfish utility maximizing agents have no incentive to lie about their true preferences, has been studied in innumerable settings. The vast majority of these mechanisms, however, assume the existence of money-a carefully designed payment scheme incentivizes agents to report their preferences truthfully. However, there are settings where monetary transfers are not feasible, either because of ethical or legal issues [16] , or because of practical issues with enforcing and collecting payments [17] . This observation has led to a growing literature on designing mechanisms that incentivize agents to report their true preferences without using payments: for convenience, we refer to such mechanisms as strategyproof.
In this paper, we focus on the design of strategyproof mechanisms for assignment problems. An instance of an assignment problem consists of a bipartite graph with items, or jobs, on one side, and bins, or machines, on the other; associated with each bin is a capacity, and with each edge a value and a size. A feasible assignment is a (partial) mapping from items to bins, where no bin's capacity is exceeded by the sizes of the items assigned to it. The goal is to compute a feasible assignment that maximizes welfare: the sum of the values of the jobs for machines they are assigned to.
The most general version of this problem, where both the size and value of a job can differ for different machines, is referred to as the generalized assignment problem (GAP). A number of well-known algorithmic assignment problems are special cases of the GAP. For instance, the problem with just one bin is the knapsack problem, and the problem with unit-sized items and bins is the maximum weight bipartite matching problem. Assignment problems are ubiquitous, and have been extensively studied due to their vast applicability, both from an algorithmic and mechanism design perspective. However, studying these problems in a setting without money adds additional difficulties, since the usual monotonicity properties (see [15, 3, 13, 16] ) no longer suffice for truthfulness. Moreover, the popular VCG-based mechanisms generally require payments for truthfulness.
There are a number of settings where part of the input to an assignment problem is held by selfish agents, and the problem must be solved without the use of money. Unfortunately, as we discuss in § 2.3, not much can be done if jobs hold their real-number values for the various machines private; this is consistent with many impossibility results from social choice theory. In this paper, we therefore focus on a restricted, yet natural, setting that admits interesting results-for each pair (i, j), it is public knowledge that the value of job i for machine j is either vij or 0, but job i holds private which of those is the case for each j. This models situations where the private data encodes a compatibility relation between jobs and machines; the public vij values arise in situations where the value derived from an assignment materializes over a public channel (for instance via a verifiable financial transaction). As a result, a job cannot hide its true value for any machine it anticipates being assigned to, although it can misreport a non-zero value as 0. We will see that, if the mechanism is not chosen carefully, such strategic manipulations can be beneficial to a selfish agent even in very simple instances of the GAP. We also note that this is a multi-parameter problem, where each job holds one bit of private information for each of the bins.
There are several natural settings that correspond to our model of private values. Suppose, for instance, a group of people are to split up a collection of tasks. Each task requires different skills, and how well each person can perform a task is public knowledge. Each task also has different time and location constraints, and whether or not the constraint is feasible for a person is only known privately to her. This problem is an instance of weighted bipartite matching; while finding an optimal solution is computationally easy, we are interested in algorithms that also ensure strategyproofness. In another example, consider scheduling jobs on a collection of non-identical machines. The value of running a job on a machine, as well as the time it takes, is public knowledge. However, each job requires specific hardware and software that is available on only some of the machines. Moreover, only the owner of the job knows which machines are compatible with the job. Here, the algorithm used to assign jobs to machines must ensure that the jobs do not have an incentive to lie about which machines are compatible.
As in [17] , we are interested in strategyproof mechanisms that achieve a good approximation to the welfare of the optimal omniscient solution. The need for approximations arises for two reasons in our work: first, the GAP is NP-hard, as are several of its special cases; i.e., approximation is necessitated by computational intractability. The second reason is much more interesting-unlike in settings with payments, solving the allocation problem optimally does not necessarily lead to a truthful mechanism, and we need to sacrifice approximation in order to obtain truthfulness. We will see both factors playing a role as we seek strategyproof mechanisms that are good approximations to the various special cases of GAP. For example, we will see that no strategy proof mechanism for maximum-weight matching can be optimal, and we must sacrifice an approximation factor of 2 for truthfulness. In contrast, a (non-polynomial time) algorithm that returns an optimal solution to the multiple knapsack problem is strategyproof; however, since we are interested in polynomial-time strategyproof algorithms, we must resort to an approximately optimal mechanism that is both truthful and polynomial-time implementable.
Why would an agent benefit from lying in assignment problems when there are no payments? Consider, for instance, the weighted bipartite matching problem ( §3.2). Consider the following instance: job a1 has edges with weights 1 + ǫ and 1 to machines b1 and b2, and job a2 has an edge to b1 with weight 1. An algorithm that simply chooses the maximum weight matching according to the reports incentivizes job a1 to simply claim that the second edge does not exist: in the first case, the assignment chosen is (a1, b2), (a2, b1), whereas in the second case, the assignment chosen is (a1, b1), which suits a1 better, with value 1 + ǫ. This example makes it clear that that the optimal (and obvious) algorithms are not necessarily truthful-not surprisingly, a carefully designed algorithm is essential to ensure that no agent has an incentive to lie, exactly as in mechanism design with money.
Our Results
We study the design of approximation mechanisms that are truthful without money for several variants of the GAP. We begin in § 3 with matching, which can be solved optimally in polynomial time from a purely computational perspective. We show that for the maximum matching problem, where all edge values are equal, simply returning the optimal solution while breaking ties consistently leads to a strategyproof mechanism. However, when a job's value depends on the machine, as in weighted bipartite matching, no deterministic strategyproof mechanism can achieve an approximation better than 2; we provide such a mechanism.
Next, we examine knapsack-like variants of the GAP. Instead of specially tailored combinatorial algorithms, we extend the techniques in [14] to reduce designing a truthful mechanism without money to designing such a mechanism for the fractional version of the problem: if the strategyproof mechanism for the fractional version yields an α approximation to the optimal fractional solution, and the corresponding LP has integrality gap β, we derive a strategyproof randomized mechanism for the original problem with approximation ratio α · β. This technique applies to a large class of packing problems, and may of independent interest.
The GAP has integrality gap 2, so a fractional strategyproof mechanism with approximation ratio α yields a 2α strategyproof (in expectation) mechanism for each of the knapsack-like variants of the GAP that we study. In § 4.2, we show, using network flows, that solving the fractional version of the multiple knapsack problem (MKP) optimally, while breaking ties consistently independent of the reported edges, gives an optimal strategyproof (fractional) mechanism. For size-invariant GAP (SIGAP), there is no optimal truthful (fractional) mechanism without money-in §4.3, we design a strategyproof, 2-approximate greedy algorithm for fractional SIGAP. Using our extension of [14] gives, respectively, 2 and 4-approximate strategyproof mechanisms for MKP and SIGAP. In §4.4, we sketch the construction of a 4-approximate strategyproof mechanism for value-invariant GAP (VIGAP), as well as a O(log n)-approximate strategyproof mechanism for the GAP.
We point out that without the polynomial time restriction, there exist optimal strategyproof mechanisms for all variants of GAP where a node has the same value for each of its neighbors. That is, for maximum matching, MKP and VIGAP, simply solving the problem optimally, while breaking ties consistently independent of the private values (edges), leads to a truthful-without-money mechanism. For these problems, it is only computational intractability which causes us to lose an approximation factor. This is in contrast to the variants where a node has different values for different edges such as maximum weight matching and its generaliza-tions. There, as we show in Theorem 3.3, strategyproofness and optimality cannot be achieved simultaneously.
Related Work
Assignment problems have been studied extensively in the algorithms literature. Shmoys and Tardos [18] presented a 2-approximation for a minimization version of the GAP, and Chekuri and Khanna [10] observed that a 2-approximation to the maximization version -the version considered in this paper -is implicit in [18] . Moreover, it was shown in [10] that the multiple knapsack problem admits a PTAS
1 , yet most generalizations of MKP -including the GAP-are APX hard. Fleischer et al [12] obtained a e e−1 approximation for the GAP, and showed that this is optimal for a slight generalization of the GAP. However, Feige and Vondrak [11] then showed that the GAP admits an approximation slightly better than e e−1 , and this is the best currently known. A number of results for the mechanism design version of assignment problems are known, although these are all in settings with money. In all of these results, the items hold their values private, and the rest of the instance is public. A 2-approximate truthful-in-expectation mechanism follows immediately from the framework of Lavi and Swamy [14] . Moreover, Briest et al [7] devised a truthful FPTAS for the knapsack problem, as well as a truthful PTAS for VI-GAP when the number of bins is fixed. Recently, Azar and Gamzu [5] obtained a truthful 11-approximate mechanism for a variant of MKP, and Chekuri and Gamzu obtained a 2 + ǫ approximation for a variant of VIGAP. We note that all the above mechanisms use money, and moreover the mechanisms in [7, 5, 9] consider an incomparable setting to ours: our model is multi-parameter whereas theirs is singleparameter, but we consider a binary private value for each item and bin as opposed to an arbitrary real number.
Mechanisms without money have a rich history in the social choice literature; for a survey, see [16] . Interest in approximate mechanisms without money has been sparked by the recent work of Procaccia and Tennenholtz [17] , which introduces the idea of using approximation to enable truthfulness in settings where solving optimally does not admit truthfulness without money. Approximate mechanisms without money have been developed for facility location [17, 1] , and selecting influential nodes in a social graph [2] . In very recent work, Ashlagi et al. [4] study strategyproof mechanisms for matching motivated by kidney exchange. While we also study (bipartite) matching as a special case of the GAP, their model is very different from ours. Also related is the work of [8] , which studies a very general combinatorial assignment problem without money, and designs a mechanism which sacrifices efficiency, as well as weakens the notion of incentive compatibility, to achieve fairness.
MODEL
We describe the optimization version of the Generalized Assignment Problem (GAP), as well as its various special cases that we consider, in §2.1. We then review truthfulness in §2.2, and discuss the limitations of truthfulness without money for the GAP in §2.3. These limitations motivate our model of private valuations, which we then introduce in §2.4. 1 However, we note that this PTAS is not applicable to the generalization of MKP that we consider, where assignments are constrained by a bipartite graph over items and bins. It follows from [10, Theorem 3.2] that this is APX-hard.
The Generalized Assignment Problem
In the GAP, there are n jobs and m machines. We denote the set of jobs by [n] = {1, . . . , n}, and the set of machines by [m] = {1, . . . , m}. Machine j has capacity cj ∈ R + . For each job i and machine j, we associate a value vij ∈ R + and a size sij ∈ R
+ . An assignment is a function
S { * } partially mapping jobs to machines, where * indicates that a job is left unassigned. We use x(i) to denote the machine (or * ) that job i is assigned to. Moreover, the binary variable xij indicates whether x(i) = j. A feasible assignment may allocate to machine j a set of jobs of total size at most cj. The GAP can be written as an integer program with decision variables {xij } ij ; the LP relaxation obtained by relaxing the constraint xij ∈ {0, 1} is given below.
The above LP is known to have an integrality gap of 2, and the rounding can be done in polynomial time [18, 10] .
As detailed in §2.4, we consider a setting where the private data is a bipartite graph specifying job-machine compatibility. That is, the private data are not the values vij or the sizes sij , but rather the existence of the edge (i, j). Note that this does not change the GAP from an algorithmic point of view, since one can encode the compatibility relation in the values {vij } ij . We define GAP[E] for a bipartite graph E ⊆ [n]×[m] as the problem of computing the welfaremaximizing assignment using only edges in E. The LP relaxation (GAP[E] LP) is essentially identical to (GAP LP), with the additional constraints xij = 0 for (i, j) / ∈ E. We distinguish several variants of the GAP and their respective bipartite-graph versions. The Size-Invariant Generalized Assignment Problem (henceforth SIGAP) is the problem where the size of a job i does not depend on the machine -we denote this size by si. Similarly, the Value-Invariant Generalized Assignment Problem (henceforth VIGAP) is the problem where the value of a job i does not depend on the machine -we denote the value by vi. The Multiple Knapsack Problem (henceforth MKP) is the problem where neither size nor value depend on the machine. The knapsack problem (henceforth KP) is MKP with m = 1.
In addition to knapsack-type problems like those dicussed above, the GAP also generalizes bipartite matching problems. The maximum weight bipartite matching problem (henceforth MWBM) is the problem where all capacities and sizes are 1. The maximum bipartite matching problem (henceforth MBM) is the special case of MWBM where all values are 1. The latter is only interesting when constrained by a graph; that is, when we consider
When discussing a special case of GAP, say MKP, we refer to the bipartite-graph constrained version as MKP [E] . Moreover, we refer to (GAP LP) and (GAP[E] LP) as (MKP LP) and (MKP[E] LP), respectively. We also use similar notation for other special cases of the GAP. Figure 1 illustrates the ordering of the various assignment problems by generality. We now summarize the known algorithmic results, both upper and lower bounds, for variants of the GAP. The best known upperbound for GAP is a
Figure 1: Relationships between Assignment Problems
Arrow indicates the second problem is a special case of the first. The ≡ symbol indicates computationally equivalent problems.
constant slightly better than e e−1 [11] , and the best known lowerbound is APX-hardness. The same upper and lower bounds are the best known for GAP[E], SIGAP, SIGAP[E], VIGAP, VIGAP[E], and MKP [E] . The MKP stands out in admitting a PTAS, and yet is strongly NP-hard. The bipartite matching problems we consider, on the other hand, are all sovable in polynomial time.
Truthfulness
We consider the setting where jobs are selfish agents, and their private types encode information about their value for being assigned on different machines. Other information, such as n,m, {sij} ij and {cj} m j=1 is considered public 2 .
We assume that player i has a type vi = {vij } m j=1 , specifying his value for the different machines. We assume the possible types of player i are restricted to some public set Vi ⊆ R m , and use V to denote V1×. . . Vn. For example, when working in the multiple knapsack problem, we require that for each job i there is a real number vi such that vij = vi for all j. Moreover, as we will see in §2.3, no interesting results without money are possible if possible values are unbounded. Therefore, our positive results will assume a restricted, discrete set of possible types described in §2. 4 .
A mechanism without money for the GAP is simply an algorithm that takes in all the problem data, public and private, and outputs an assignment of the jobs to the machines. We allow our mechanisms to be randomized. We use A(I, v) to denote the output of mechanism A on public data I and private data v ∈ V. Each mechanism A and instance of the public data I induces a social choice rule : a function A(I, * ) mapping private valuations to assignments. 2 It is conceivable that the job sizes sij are private information as well. However, if jobs can lie about their sizes, we need to define the utility to a job when it is fractionally assigned-a job can either derive fractional utility from a fractional assignment, or zero utility if it is not fully assigned to a machine. Both models are reasonable; for the first, a nontrivial proof shows that no reasonable approximation can be obtained by any randomized strategyproof mechanism. For the second model , where jobs derive no utility from partial assignments, it turns out that jobs have no incentive to lie about their sizes in any of the algorithms we design.
We now state truthfulness without money generally. 
Similarly, a randomized mechanism A is truthful in expectation without money if and only if
In other words, a mechanism A is truthful if a job never benefits from misreporting its private data. A randomized mechanism A is truthful in expectation if no (risk-neutral) job has an incentive to misreport its private data.
Limits of Truthfulness without Money
Here, we will justify considering a discrete valuation model by observing that, assuming general valuations, no interesting results are possible. Indeed, we assume a restricted setting: the knapsack problem, with a knapsack of capacity 1, and jobs of size 1. If Vi = R + for each i, then it is easy to see that this is equivalent to the classical problem of a single item auction [19] . It is well known that no nontrivial guarantees are possible for a single-item auction if the mechanism is required to be truthful-in-expectation without using money. In fact, it is easy to see that no mechanism can outperform the trivial one which allocates the item (in our case, the entire capacity of the knapsack) uniformly at random, achieving an approximation ratio of n.
The Private Graph Valuation Model
Given that no nontrivial upperbounds are possible when players can arbitrarily misrepresent their values, we consider a restricted model of the valuations: one of a discrete nature as is characteristic of many problems for which truthfulness without money is possible. We assume job i has a value of δij vij for being assigned to machine j, where vij is public and δij ∈ {0, 1} is private. In other words, jobs may not lie about their potential value vij (that is, vij are publicly known or verifiable), yet they may lie about which machines they are compatible with. This compatibility relation is encoded via a bipartite graph on the jobs and machines. Each job's private data is the set of its outgoing edges, i.e. the machines with which it is compatible. As we discuss in §1, this situation arises in many natural settings.
An instance of the GAP on a private bipartite graph is a tuple (I, E), where I = ({vij } ij , {sij } ij , {cj } j ) is public information, and E ⊆ [n] × [m] is private information solicited from the jobs. E is a set of edges summarizing the compatibility of jobs and machines, where job i's private data is the set Ei ⊆ E of edges in E incident on i. A job i receives value vij from being assigned to machine j only if (i, j) ∈ E, else it receives value 0. Our goal is to maximize welfare via a mechanism that, without using money, incentivizes i to report her set Ei of edges truthfully.
We can now restate truthfulness as it applies to our model. We use A(I, E) to denote the assignment computed by mechanism A on instance (I, E). Moreover, for an edge set E we use Ei ⊆ E to denote the set of edges with one endpoint at job i, and use E−i to denote E \ Ei. 
Similarly, a randomized mechanism A is truthful in expectation if and only if
Note that the summation on both sides of the inequality is over the set of true edges Ei: that is, A is truthful [in expectation] if when a job misreports its incident edges, its [expected] utility from the new assignment x ′ does not increase on its true edges Ei.
COMBINATORIAL MECHANISMS FOR MATCHING
We will show that optimally solving the maximum matching problem, with some careful tiebreaking, yields a strategyproof polynomial-time mechanism. For maximum weight matching, we show matching upper and lower bounds of 2 for truthful mechanisms without money, and a constant lowerbound for truthful-in-expectation mechanisms.
Warmup: Maximum Bipartite Matching
We consider the Maximum Bipartite Matching problem, constrained by a private bipartite graph E. We observe that simply finding the maximum matching, using consistent tiebreaking, immediately gives a strategyproof mechanism. The straightforward proof is omitted.
Proposition 3.1. Fix a total order ≺ on matchings in the complete bipartite graph. For a set of edges E, let M (E) denote the set of matchings on edge set E. Let A be the mechanism that, on input (I, E), finds the ≺-minimal matching in the set argmax x∈M (E) P ij xij. Then A is truthful.
Therefore, it suffices to define ≺ so that the ≺-minimal maximum-matching on E can be computed in polynomial time. This gives the following proposition, whose straightforward proof is omitted.
There is a polynomial-time, withoutmoney mechanism for maximum bipartite matching that is optimal, and truthful in the private graph model.
Maximum Weight Bipartite Matching
Next, we consider the MWBM problem, constrained by a private bipartite graph E. Unlike MBM, we show constant lower bounds on the approximation ratio of truthful and truthful in expectation mechanisms. Proof. First, consider a deterministic mechanism A. Assume for a contradiction that A attains an approximation α < 2. Consider Figure 2( Figure 2 (b). A cannot assign job 2 at all under these new bids, as that would violate truthfulness. Therefore, when given the bids in Figure 2 (b), the welfare of the solution is at most γ, whereas the optimal is γ + 1. Letting γ be sufficiently close to 1 gives the contradiction. Now, we consider an arbitrary truthful-in-expectation mechanism A on Figure 2(a) . At least one of the jobs must be assigned to the preferred machine a with probability no more than 1/2; without loss of generality this is job 2. Job 2 derives value at most (γ + 1)/2. Now, consider job 2 changing his bid as in Figure 2(b) . By truthfulness, now A can assign job 2 with probability at most p = (γ + 1)/2γ. Therefore, the welfare of the assignment returned on the bids of Figure  2 (b) is at most γ + 1 − (1 − p) · 1 = γ + p. However, the optimum is still γ + 1, so the approximation ratio is at least
Using elementary calculus, we can choose γ to maximize this expression and complete the proof. Therefore, we cannot hope for better than a constant factor approximation (specifically a PTAS, randomized or deterministic, is not possible). We will show a factor 2 deterministic truthful mechanism, matching Theorem 3.3. if X S {e} is a matching then 5:
Let X = X S {e} 6: end if 7: end for 8: return X Consider the greedy Algorithm 1. Notice that step (1) does not depend on the reported edges E.
Theorem 3.4. Algorithm 1 is a polynomial-time, 2 approximate, no-money truthful mechanism for maximum weight bipartite matching in the private graph model.
Proof. The approximation ratio immediately follows from a standard charging argument against the optimal solution.
For truthfulness, consider a job i misrepresenting his true edges Ei as E
. Let X be the matching returned by the algorithm on reports E, and let X ′ be the matching returned on reports E ′ . If X = X ′ , then i does not improve his value. Assume X = X ′ , and let e ′ ∈ E ′ be the first edge in X ′ \ X according to the order of step (1). Since the algorithm processes edges in the bid-independent order of step (1), it is easy to see that e ′ ∈ E ′ \ E = E ′ i \ Ei. Thus, i is matched to e ′ = Ei, an edge from which he derives no value, when he reports E ′ i . This completes the proof.
LP-BASED MECHANISMS FOR KNAP-SACK TYPE PROBLEMS
The bipartite matching problems studied in the previous section can be solved in polynomial time; there, the need for approximation is a result purely of the requirement of strategyproofness. We now investigate knapsack-like variants of the GAP -unlike matching, these problems are NP-hard (in fact, they are APX-hard). The mechanisms we design have the following common structure: first, we design a truthful mechanism without money for the fractional LP relaxation of the problem. Then, as in [14] , we use a randomized procedure to obtain a feasible integral assignment from the fractional solution-this composition leads to a truthful-in-expectation mechanism without money. We introduce this technique for designing truthful mechanisms without money in §4.1, and then use it to design mechanisms without money for knapsack type assignment problems in §4.2- §2.1. Some of our analyses will use ideas from network flow theory, such as the notion of conformal decomposition. For these, we refer the reader to [6] .
A Reduction to Fractional Truthfulness
We recap the construction of Lavi and Swamy in §4.1.1. Then, we show how to apply their techniques to design mechanisms without money in §4.1.2
The Construction of Lavi and Swamy
The construction of Lavi and Swamy relies on a powerful decomposition lemma. We consider a packing -i.e. downwards closed -polytope P ⊆ R d + , and use P/α to denote the scaled down copy of P -i.e. P/α = {y/α : y ∈ P }. We say an algorithm shows an integrality gap of α for a polytope P ⊆ R d if it takes as input an arbitrary vector c ∈ R d , and outputs an integer point z ∈ P T Z d with the guarantee that: cz ≥ 1 α max{cx : x ∈ P }. Using such an algorithm, we can explicitly construct for every x ∈ P/α a distribution over integer points of P that evaluates to x in expectation.
Lemma 4.1 ([14]). If there exists a polynomial-time algorithm B that shows an integrality gap of α for P , then, for any x ∈ P/α we can compute in polynomial time a distribution Dx over
Armed with the above lemma, Lavi and Swamy reduce designing a truthful-in-expectation mechanism (with money) to designing a truthful fractional mechanism (also with money).
They consider welfare maximization problems in a fairly general form. Let P ⊆ R+ d be a packing polytope representing the set of feasible solutions. Moreover, assume that there are n players [n], and the valuation function vi : R d → R of player i is required to lie in some valid set of linear valuations Vi ⊆ R R d . We denote V = V1 ×V2 . . .×Vn. The combinatorial welfare maximization problem (henceforth CWMP) over P and V is the problem of finding an integer point in P maximizing the sum of values of the players. This gives the following LP relaxation, which we refer to as the fractional welfare maximization problem (henceforth FWMP):
We can define truthful-in-expectation mechanisms for a CWMP in the usual way. Moreover, we define a fractional mechanism as a pair M = (f, p) where f : V → P is a fractional allocation rule, and p : V → R n is a payment scheme. We say M is a truthful fractional mechanism if the following holds for each v ∈ V and vi ∈ Vi
It is easy to see that we can use the VCG mechanism to obtain a truthful fractional mechanism M f rac for the fractional welfare maximization problem. Moreover, when optimizing objectives in V over P can be done efficiently, M f rac is a polynomial time mechanism. Lavi and Swamy observed that, given an efficient approximation algorithm that shows the integrality gap of P in the sense defined above, one can obtain a polynomial-time, truthful-in-expectation mechanism Mexp for the combinatorial problem that looks simply like a copy of M f rac scaled down by the integrality gap. This follows from Lemma 4.1. We now state the main theorem of [14] . 
The Reduction for Mechanisms Without Money
The construction of Lavi and Swamy reduces designing a truthful-in-expectation mechanism Mexp for a CWMP to designing a truthful mechanism M f rac for its fractional version. Mexp can be interpreted simply as a copy of M f rac scaled down by α. While the truthful mechanism M f rac they construct simply solves the fractional problem optimally and uses VCG payments, we observe that this need not be the case. Indeed, this is crucial for our purposes; for some of the assignment problems we are interested in, the optimal algorithm for the fractional problem requires non-zero payments for truthfulness. Instead, we sacrifice optimality in the fractional solution to get a truthful fractional mechanism with zero payments. Then we use the fractional mechanism to get a scaled down truthful-in-expectation mechanism -also with zero payments -for the combinatorial problem as in Theorem 4.2.
By examining the proof of Theorem 4.2, we notice that the assumption that the fractional mechanism solves the LP exactly is not used. In fact, an arbitrary truthful mechanism M f rac for the fractional problem can be converted to a truthful-in-expectation mechanism Mexp for the combinatorial problem, with a loss in approximation ratio equal to the integrality gap of the LP relaxation. Moreover, we notice that the payment scheme pexp of mechanism Mexp is simply a scaled down copy of the payment scheme p f rac of M f rac . In particular, if M f rac is a truthful mechanism without money for the fractional problem, then Mexp is a truthful-in-expectation mechanism without money for the combinatorial problem. We sum up these observations in the following Lemma. In other words, we reduce the problem of designing a truthful-in-expectation mechanism without money to that of designing such a mechanism for its fractional relaxation. This will prove particularly useful, since arguing about truthfulness of a continuous fractional assignment algorithm is more tractable than designing a combinatorial algorithm directly. Moreover, since the integrality gap of (GAP LP) is 2, an α-approximate mechanism for a fractional assignment problem gives a 2α-approximate mechanism for the integral problem. (Recall that the algorithm of [18, 10] shows an integrality gap of 2 for GAP as needed for Lemma 4. 
The Multiple Knapsack Problem
We consider the multiple knapsack problem on a private bipartite graph E. First, we make the simple observation that, if we ignore computational constraints, there exists a truthful optimal mechanism for the multiple knapsack problem in the private graph model. As in maximum (unweighted) bipartite matching, simply returning an optimal solution, breaking ties consistently, leads to a strategyproof mechanism. The straightforward proof is omitted.
Proposition 4.5. Consider the without-money mechanism that, on reports E ⊆ [n] × [m], finds the optimal integral solution to MKP[E] LP, breaking ties consistently via an arbitrary total order on the set of assignments ([m]
S { * }) [n] . This mechanism is truthful in the private graph model.
The above implies that, unlike maximum weight matching and its various generalizations, MKP is not fundamentally incompatible with truthfulness without money -at least when ignoring computational constraints. Nevertheless, MKP on a bipartite graph is APX-hard. Therefore, we consider the problem of finding a truthful constant-factor approximation. Though a simple greedy algorithm gives a deterministic, truthful 2 + ǫ approximation, we will instead illustrate our techniques from Section 4.1 -which will also come in handy for other generalizations of the GAP -by designing a randomized, 2-approximate, truthful-inexpectation mechanism for MKP in our model. By the discussion in §4.1, it suffices to devise a truthful fractional algorithm in the sense of Equation (5) Consider Algorithm 2 for the fractional multiple knapsack problem on a bipartite graph. First of all, it is easy to see that Algorithm 2 can be implemented in polynomial time by solving a sequence of linear programs in step (2) . In order to show truthfulness, we will use a flow-based interpretation of Algorithm 2. For reported edges E, we define graph G[E], seen in Figure 3 , as follows. There is a node for each job, and a node for each machine. We connect job i to machine j if (i, j) ∈ E, with weight w (i,j) = 0 and capacity c (i,j) = ∞. Next, we include a source node s, and create an edge (s, i) for each job i with weight w (s,i) = vi/si and capacity c (s,i) = si. We then create a sink t and create an edge (j, t) for each machine j, with weight w (j,t) = 0 and capacity c (j,t) = cj. Finally, we connect the sink to the source via an edge (t, s) with w (t,s) = 0 and capacity c (t,s) = ∞.
Observe that fractional assignments [0, 1] [n]× [m] . We abuse notation and use ≺ to refer to both total orders, and let fx ≺ fy if and only if x ≺ y. Notice that ≺ also orders feasible circulations lexicographically. Therefore, we can interpret Algorithm 2 as finding the ≺-minimal maximum-weight feasible circulation in G[E], and then converting it to the corresponding assignment.
Next
′ (Ei) (note that this is because vij = vi in MKP). Equivalently, we need to show P
, where we use the convention f (e) = 0 when f is a flow on G[E] and e / ∈ E (and the same for G[E ′ ]). We will show that any increase in job i's utility after lying implies that one of fx or f x ′ is suboptimal, yielding a contradiction. We begin with the following lemma. 
fx(e) then ∆ can be conformally decomposed (see [6] ) into {C, ∆ − C} where: (1) C is a flow cycle, and (2) C sends positive flow on both (s, i) and some e ∈ Ei T E ′ i . Proof. It is known [6] that every circulation can be conformally decomposed into flow cycles. Let˘C 1 , . . . , C k¯b e such a decomposition. It suffices to show that some C j satisfies conditions (1) and (2) .
Since x ′ sends more flow on edges in Ei than x, some C j enters i through an edge e ′ / ∈ Ei, and exits through an edge e ∈ Ei. By conformality and the fact that x ′ sends no flow on Ei \ E ′ i , we know that e ∈ Ei T E ′ i . Moreover, by conformality and the fact that x sends no flow on edges in E ′ i \ Ei, it is easy to see that e ′ / ∈ E ′ i \ E. Therefore, the only remaining possibility is that e ′ = (s, i).
This yields truthfulness of the algorithm.
Lemma 4.7. Algorithm 2 is a truthful fractional mechanism
Proof. Fix an instance (I, E), and assume for a contradiction that a player i with true edges Ei benefits by reporting E ′ i instead. Let x and x ′ be the assignments computed by the algorithm on reports E and
fx(e). Let ∆ and C be as in Lemma 4.6. Observe that C does not send flow on any edges in the symmetric difference of Ei and E ′ i . By conformality, it is easy to see that fx +C is a feasible circulation in G[E], and moreoever
. If the weight w(C) of circulation C is non-zero, then one of fx or f x ′ is non-optimal. Therefore, w(C) = 0. Now notice that, by definition of ≺, either fx + C ≺ fx or f x ′ −C ≺ f x ′ . Therefore, one of fx or f x ′ is not a ≺-minimal optimal solution, yielding the contradiction.
Combining with Corollary 4.4, we get the Theorem. 
Size-Invariant GAP
We consider the size-invariant generalized assignment problem on a private bipartite graph E. Since SIGAP generalizes MWBM, by Theorem 3.3 no deterministic truthful approximation can achieve better than a factor 2 approximation, and moreover no truthful in expectation PTAS is possible. In this section, we devise a 4-approximate withoutmoney mechanism for SIGAP that is truthful-in-expectation in the private graph model. Even though solving SIGAP[E] LP is not fractionally truthful (again, by Theorem 3.3), we show that a simple greedy algorithm is fractionally truthful and yields a 2-approximate solution the LP. Combining this with Corollary 4.4, we get a 4-approximate, without-money mechanism for SIGAP that is truthful in expectation in the private graph model. Consider the following algorithm. , breaking ties arbitrarily. 2: for all (i, j) ∈ E, in the order defined above do 3:
Fractionally assign as much of job i on machine j, until the job is exhausted or the machine is full. 4: end for 5: return the resulting assignment x. Proof. This can be shown by a charging argument, best formalized by constructing a feasible solution to a dual of SIGAP[E] LP of value at most twice the value attained by the algorithm. This dual is shown below, and has decision variables u ∈ R n and z ∈ R m :
we make a simple observation about the algorithm that will be useful in the proof. We now construct the dual solution u, z in parallel with the execution of the algorithm as follows. Begin with u = 0 and z = 0. Consider the iteration of Algorithm 3 corresponding to edge e = (i, j). If job i is exhausted on this iteration, set ui = vij . If the capacity on machine j is exhausted on this iteration, set zj = vij /si. Notice that, in both cases, this satisfies the dual constraint corresponding to edge (i, j). If no assignment is made on this iteration -i.e. either i or j was exhausted in a previous iteration -then we do not update the dual variables. Indeed, there is no need to do so for feasibility: By Observation 4.10, if i is already exhausted then already ui ≥ vij , and if j is already exhausted then already zj ≥ vij /si, and either suffices to satisfy the dual constraint for edge e. It remains to bound the value of the dual solution as compared to the primal solution. First, we write twice the value of the primal in a convenient form:
Observe that, by Observation 4.10, ui lower-bounds the value of any edge on which any part of job i is assigned, and zj lower-bounds the density of any job assigned to machine j. Moreover, ui is non-zero only if i is fully assigned, and zj is non-zero only if j is full. Therefore, we get
The final term is precisely the value of the dual. Invoking weak LP duality completes the proof.
It remains to show that Algorithm 3 is fractionally truthful. We begin with an observation. As in section 4.2, we use a network flow interpretation. We define graph
. This construction is similar to that of §4.2, and the graph is shown in Figure   4 . As in §4. 3. C enters i through some e ∈ Ei \ E ′ i , with C(e) < 0.
C exits
5. w e ′ > we.
Proof. Consider the conformal decomposition of ∆ into cycles C 1 , . . . , C k . It suffices to show that some C j satisfies the conditions above. By assumption, there is a cycle C in the decomposition with P It remains to establish condition 2. Observe that fx +C is a feasible circulation on G[E]. Since fx is a lexicographically maximal feasible circulation on G[E], we deduce C ≺ 0.
We are now ready to show truthfulness. Recall that C ≺ 0. Thus, if f x ′ − C were feasible in G[E ′ ] we would be done, as we would contradict Observation 4.11. However, this is not the case, as f x ′ − C sends positive flow on edge e ∈ Ei \ E ′ i . We remedy this by simply zeroing out the flow on edge e = (i, j), as follows: Let D be the flow cycle through s, i, j, t such that f x ′ − C − D sends no flow on e. It is clear that f x ′ − C − D is a feasible circulation on G[E ′ ]. We claim that still f x ′ − C − D ≻ f x ′ . To see this, notice that by condition 5 of Lemma 4.12, edge e is not the greatest weight edge with non-zero flow in −C. Thus, since −C ≻ 0, it is easy to see that also −C − D ≻ 0. Therefore f x ′ − C − D ≻ f x ′ , as needed.
VIGAP and GAP
In this section, we overview the results we obtain for VI-GAP and GAP, utilizing the techniques developed in §4.1-4.3. However, since these differ from our results so far only technically, we defer details to the full version of the paper.
Consider the VIGAP. We observe that Proposition 4.5 holds essentially unchanged; that is, solving VIGAP optimally gives a truthful mechanism in our model. Next, we observe that greedy Algorithm 3, when adapted to the fractional VIGAP (namely, density d (i,j) is now defined as vi/sij ), still provides a 2-approximation by essentially the same analysis. An more involved inductive argument is needed to show that this fractional algorithm is truthful; We defer this technical, yet simple, proof to the full version of the paper. We get the following theorem. We now turn to the GAP. First, we make an assumption -to be removed later -that the maximum value vmax of an edge in E is publicly known up-front. Under this assumption, we can reduce the design of a truthful mechanism for GAP to the truthful mechanism for VIGAP with a loss of O(log n) in the approximation ratio. In particular, we randomly pick v ∈ n vmax, , j) ). This gives an instance of VIGAP that we can solve using the mechanism of Theorem 4.15. It is easy to verify that, in expectation, this reduction results in a loss of at most O(log n) in the approximation ratio. However, to ensure truthfulness we need to guarantee that edge (i, j) actually results in value exactly b vij if chosen; we do so by positing up-front that, whenever job i is assigned to machine j by the subroutine that solves VIGAP, we cancel i's assignment with probability 1 − b vij /vij . It is now easy to see that, under our original assumption that vmax is known up-front, this mechanism is truthful-in-expectation and has an approximation ratio of O(log n).
We now remove the assumption that vmax is public knowledge by appropriately incentivizing the job with the maximum value edge. In particular, after receiving the reported edges E, we flip a fair coin. If the coin turns up heads, we assign the job with the maximum value edge on that edge (i.e., to his favorite machine, with value vmax), and leave all other jobs unassigned. If the coin turns up tails, we discard the job with the maximum value edge, and proceed with the algorithm described above using this value of vmax. It is easy to see that this is still an O(log n) approximation algorithm. Moreover, the job with the maximum value edge can do no better than report his true edges, and no job has incentive to falsely claim a maximum value edge. This gives the following theorem. We leave open the question of whether there exists a constant factor truthful [in expectation] mechanism without money for the GAP in our model.
